

Séminaire

Implémentation d'algorithmes dédiés dans TAGADA



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A series of thin, light blue lines forming a complex geometric pattern of triangles and polygons in the bottom-left corner of the slide.

01

Introduction

- Sécurisation d'un chiffrement dès sa conception.
- Utilisation de solveurs génériques.
- Introduction de bibliothèques pour automatiser ces procédures.



Qu'est ce que TAGADA (Delobel et al., 2023)?

- Outil de cryptanalyse différentielle.
- Recherche à maximiser $\mathbb{P}(\delta_{out} \mid \delta_{in})$
- Technique actuellement utilisée dans l'outil : programmation par contrainte.
- But : utiliser des techniques de programmation dynamique pour résoudre ce problème.

A series of thin, light blue lines forming a complex geometric pattern of triangles and polygons, located in the bottom left corner of the slide.

02

Etat de l'art

#Rounds	<i>Obj_{Step1}</i> (Nb sols)				MILP				<i>Step1-enum</i> MiniZinc/SAT				Ad-Hoc				Choco			
	SK	TK1	TK2	TK3	SK	TK1	TK2	TK3	SK	TK1	TK2	TK3	SK	TK1	TK2	TK3	SK	TK1	TK2	TK3
3	5 (4)	1 (12)	0 (1)	0 (1)	1s	1s	-	-	1s	1s	-	-	1s	21s	69s	69s	7s	1s	-	-
4	8 (3)	2 (9)	0 (1)	0 (1)	1s	1s	-	-	4s	1s	-	-	1s	22s	25s	76s	7s	1s	-	-
5	12 (2)	3 (2)	1 (12)	0 (1)	1s	1s	1s	-	4s	1s	1s	-	1s	21s	22s	103s	7s	1s	1s	-
6	16 (1)	6 (2)	2 (10)	0 (1)	1s	1s	1s	-	6s	1s	1s	-	1s	22s	22s	25s	7s	3s	1s	-
7	26 (4)	10 (2)	3 (2)	1 (12)	1s	1s	1s	1s	17s	8s	1s	1s	1s	21s	22s	22s	7s	7s	1s	1s
8	36 (17)	13 (1)	6 (2)	2 (11)	1s	1s	1s	1s	140s	7s	4s	2s	1s	22s	31s	23s	7s	8s	3s	1s
9	41 (2)	16 (1)	9 (1)	3 (3)	2s	2s	2s	2s	57s	11s	7s	1s	1s	22s	24s	26s	8s	9s	7s	1s
10	46 (2)	23 (1)	12 (2)	6 (3)	7s	5s	3s	2s	97s	46s	15s	10s	1s	22s	24s	27s	9s	60s	55s	2s
11	51 (2)	32 (2)	16 (1)	10 (3)	8s	11s	4s	3s	312s	29m	22s	24s	1s	23s	25s	32s	23s	188m	86s	34s
12	55 (2)	38 (7)	21 (1)	13 (2)	13s	35s	7s	3s	468s	> 24h	113s	35s	1s	24s	27s	25s	75s	> 24h	43m	288s
13	58 (6)	41 (2)	25 (2)	16 (2)	9s	53s	17s	6s	14m		14m	104s	1s	24s	30s	27s	249s		> 24h	56m
14	61 (2)	45 (3)	31 (1)	19 (1)	23s	93s	27s	8s	491s		72m	148s	1s	24s	39s	28s	10m			> 24h
15	66 (2)	49 (1)	35 (1)	24 (4)	69s	245s	75s	21s	27m		> 24h	157m	1s	25s	46s	34s	85m			
16	75 (8)	54 (1)	40 (2)	27 (1)	12m	423s	148s	39s	128m			251m	1s	25s	57s	38s	> 24h			
17	82 (4)	59 (5)	43 (1)	31 (2)	46m	22m	213s	53s	106m			> 24h	1s	27s	59s	48s				
18	88 (4)	62 (1)	47 (1)	35 (1)	178m	31m	535s	64s	403m				1s	27s	76s	73s				
19	92 (4)	66 (1)	52 (1)	43 (14)	529m	56m	29m	218s	436m				1s	28s	110s	283s				
20	96 (2)	70 (2)	57 (2)	45 (2)	16h	87m	33m	340s	174m				1s	28s	193s	326s				

Table 1 – Comparison of the times of the different Step 1 tools for solving *Step 1 – enum* (SKINNY), *i.e.* to enumerate all solutions for the optimal Obj_{Step1} bound given in the first column in each scenario : **SK**, **TK1**, **TK2** and **TK3**. We report the real time on our server. Delaune et al., 2020

Algorithm 1 Calculate the minimal number of active S-boxes after R round (SK)

Require : $R \geq 1$

for all state s **do**

$N[s] \leftarrow$ the list of the next states reachable from s through one round

$C[0][s] \leftarrow$ number of actives S-boxes of s

end for

for $1 \leq r < R$ **do**

for all state s **do**

$C[r][s] \leftarrow \text{inf}$

end for

for all state s **do**

if $C[r-1][s] \neq \text{inf}$ **then**

for all state s' in $N[s]$ **do**

$c \leftarrow C[0][s'] + C[r-1][s]$

if $c < C[r][s']$ **then**

$C[r][s'] \leftarrow c$

end if

end for

end if

end for

end for

return $\min(C[R-1])$

Algorithm 2 Calculate the minimal number of active S-boxes after R round (TK)

Require : $R \geq 1$

for all state s , key k **do**

$N[k][s] \leftarrow$ the list of the next states and key reachable from s and k through one round

end for

for all states **do**

$C[s] \leftarrow$ get the cost of the state s

end for

$key \leftarrow \text{construct_not_fixed_key}$

return $\text{guess_the_best_key}(0, R, N, key, \text{inf}, \text{nb_cell})$

Algorithm 3 Guess the best key

Require : $cell \geq 0$

Require : $R \geq 1$

Require : key

Require : min

Require : nb_cell

$bound = compute_minimal_s_box(R, key, N)$

if $bound \geq min$ **then**

return min

else if $cell < nb_cell$ **then**

$cell \leftarrow cell + 1$

$key[cell - 1] \leftarrow$ fixed to inactive

$min1 \leftarrow guess_the_best_key(cell, R, N, key, min, nb_cell)$

$key[cell - 1] \leftarrow$ fixed to active

$min2 \leftarrow guess_the_best_key(cell, R, N, key, min, nb_cell)$

return $minimum(min1, min2)$

else

return $bound$

end if

Algorithm 4 Calculate the minimal number of active S-boxes after R round for a specific key

Require : $R \geq 1$

Require : *key*

Require : *N*

for all state *s* **do**

$C[0][s] \leftarrow \{\text{number of actives S-boxes of } s, \text{ key}\}$

end for

for $1 \leq r < R$ **do**

for all state *s* **do**

for all (cost *c*, key *k*) in $C[r-1][s]$ **do**

for all (state *s'*, key *k'*) in $N[k][s]$ **do**

$C[r][s] \leftarrow C[r][s] \cup \{c + \text{number of actives S-boxes of } s', k'\}$

end for

end for

end for


$C[r-1] \leftarrow \text{get_best_combinaison}(C[r-1])$

end for


return $\text{min_cost}(C[R-1])$

03

Ce qui a été réalisé
au cours du semestre



(a) Chiffrement Midori (Banik et al., 2015).



(b) Chiffrement Skinny (Beierle et al., 2016).

Figure 1 – Fonctions de chiffrement utilisées.

N_r	Skinny	Midori
4	0.02	0.06
5	0.03	0.05
6	0.03	0.05
7	0.03	0.05
8	0.03	0.06
9	0.04	0.06
10	0.04	0.07
11	0.04	0.07
12	0.04	0.08
13	0.05	0.08
14	0.05	0.08
15	0.05	0.09
16	0.05	0.09

Table 2 – Temps de calcul (s) pour les chiffrements Skinny et Midori en fonction du nombre de tours N_r .

N_r	TK1	TK2	TK3
4	1.90	0.02	0.02
5	2.20	4.30	0.03
6	3.00	1.50	0.03
7	4.10	1.90	4.20
8	5.30	1.80	1.60
9	6.90	2.50	1.70
10	9.40	5.10	2.20
11	23.00	11.00	4.00
12	42.00	23.00	5.70
13	37.00	28.00	19.00
14	44.00	45.00	27.00
15	48.00	54.00	41.00
16	59.00	106.00	74.00

Table 3 – Temps de calcul (s) pour le chiffrement Skinny en fonction du nombre de tours N_r .

Algorithm 5 Compute table of transition

```
graph ← load_graph
round_transition ← extract_round(graph)
for all state  $s$ , key  $k$  do
     $N[k][s] \leftarrow \text{round\_transition}(k, s)$ 
end for
for all states do
     $C[s] \leftarrow \text{get the cost of the state } s$ 
end for
for all key  $k$  do
     $K[k] \leftarrow \text{get the reachable key from } k$ 
end for
return  $N$ 
```

```
"type": "TruncatedDifferential",
"graph": {
  "version": [↔],
  "states": [↔],
  "functions": [↔],
  "transitions": [↔],
  "plaintext": [↔],
  "key": [],
  "ciphertext": [↔],
  "names": {↔},
  "blocks": {↔}
}
```

(a) Exemple de graphe généré par TAGADA sous format json.

N_r	Skinny	Midori	Twine
4	0.08	0.13	0.04
5	0.08	0.15	0.04
6	0.09	0.15	0.04
7	0.10	0.15	0.05
8	0.10	0.16	0.05
9	0.11	0.16	0.05
10	0.12	0.16	0.05
11	0.13	0.17	0.06
12	0.13	0.17	0.05
13	0.14	0.18	0.06
14	0.14	0.18	0.08
15	0.15	0.19	0.08
16	0.16	0.20	0.07

Table 4 – Temps de calcul (s) pour les chiffrements Skinny, Midori et Twine en fonction du nombre de tours N_r .

N_r	TK1	TK2	TK3
4	16.00	17.00	17.00
5	16.00	18.00	18.00
6	17.00	19.00	18.00
7	18.00	19.00	21.00
8	21.00	22.00	25.00
9	31.00	26.00	28.00
10	36.00	30.00	31.00
11	54.00	59.00	41.00
12	59.00	91.00	51.00
13	76.00	110.00	123.00
14	78.00	154.00	126.00
15	100.00	261.00	332.00
16	119.00	294.00	434.00

Table 5 – Temps de calcul (s) pour le chiffrement Skinny en fonction du nombre de tours N_r .

Comparaison de l'algorithme avec d'autres modèles

N_r	AR	Step1Opt_Picat	Step1Opt_Ortools	Step1Opt_Our_Work	Step1Opt_Tagada
3	7	1.94	0.64	5.69	10.38
4	16	3.28	4.15	6.63	23.28
5	23	11.78	9.53	5.92	34.64
6	30	> 2m	76.11	6.77	46.5
7	35	> 2m	> 2m	9.14	> 2m
8	38	> 2m	> 2m	6.64	> 2m
9	41	> 2m	> 2m	6.24	> 2m
10	50	> 2m	> 2m	7.02	> 2m
11	57	> 2m	> 2m	6.23	> 2m
12	62	> 2m	> 2m	6.36	> 2m
13	67	> 2m	> 2m	6.41	> 2m
14	72	> 2m	> 2m	6.25	> 2m
15	75	> 2m	> 2m	9.54	> 2m
16	84	> 2m	> 2m	9.29	> 2m

Table 6 – Temps de calculs (s) pour le chiffrement Midori (single-key) en fonction du nombre de tours N_r .

04

Améliorations futures



- Détection lors de la récupération d'états à transitions similaires.
- Gestion de la mémoire dans l'implémentation.



Des Questions?



- Banik, S., Bogdanov, A., Isobe, T., Shibutani, K., Hiwatari, H., Akishita, T., & Regazzoni, F. (2015)
Midori : A Block Cipher for Low Energy. In T. Iwata & J. H. Cheon (Éd.), *Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2015*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- Beierle, C., Jean, J., Kölbl, S., Leander, G., Moradi, A., Peyrin, T., Sasaki, Y., Sasdrich, P., & Sim, S. M. (2016)
The SKINNY Family of Block Ciphers and Its Low-Latency Variant MANTIS. In M. Robshaw & J. Katz (Éd.), *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- Delaune, S., Derbez, P., Huynh, P., Minier, M., Mollimard, V., & Prud'homme, C. (2020)
SKINNY with Scalpel – Comparing Tools for Differential Analysis.
- Delobel, F., Derbez, P., Gontier, A., Rouquette, L., & Solnon, C. (2023)
A CP-Based Automatic Tool for Instantiating Truncated Differential Characteristics.